AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING AND THE
ISSUE OF PRIVACY
Arthur J. Sills*
From a strictly scientific and technical vantage point, it appears
at this moment in history there are no limits to the precision and extent to which information may be gathered, stored, collated, and disseminated by mass data processing systems. Perhaps the most current
and extensive manifestation of this potential is evidenced by the proposed National Data Bank which would pool and standardize statistics
from twenty federal agencies.' These would include, among others, the
Census Bureau, the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, the Office of Business Economics, the Federal Reserve Board
and the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance. These government agencies now have 100 million punch cards and 30,000 computer
tapes containing information about people and companies.
Furthermore, a system of this sort could readily be adapted to
include other federal agencies, and could be tied into a massive network of federal, state, and local data systems. The mere participation
of the Department of Defense would add 14 million life histories to
the pool. Civil Service would add 8 million more. No one is sure how
many personal files the F.B.I. has, but this agency will admit to information on 100,000 "Communist sympathizers." If we proceed further to include the likes of Social Security records, police records,
medical and others, including personnel and job files, there would be
an estimated 2.8 billion listings available through a centralized data
2
bank.
Heretofore, persons concerned with the use and preparation of
automated data processing systems have concentrated primarily on a
wide span of technical and scientific considerations. State legislators and
State administrators, alike, have focused on ADP equipment, on standardization and coding of information, and on intergovernmental cooperation in the field. Training and education of ADP operators and
programmers and retraining of personnel displaced by ADP have been
additional subjects of concern. It can fairly be said, however, that the
primary emphasis has been on what we could call the nonhumanistic
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aspects of data processing. The situation is very much analogous to the
scientific and technical effort made decades ago to harness nuclear
energy with human considerations at that time being but a mere afterthought.
With respect to mass data gathering, we have also known that very
important human concerns are involved-especially for invasion of
privacy that has been occasioned by the data processing revolution. This
potential now requires increased attention. It will necessitate suitable
responses if we are to cope with a challenge to the foundations of our
democratic institutions themselves.
Advances obtainable from ADP can be desirable. They can serve
to further the progress of our communities. Better information no
doubt will provide better understanding of the interdependencies
within our pluralistic society, leading to better informed choices.3 Increased accessibility of data, coupled with budgetary and spatial savings,
will enable government to remain abreast of the future demands of its
citizens and improve existing services. Extensive utilization of raw data
in the virtually untapped field of behavioral research should provide
more accurate forecasting potential in such areas as manpower skills
and their availability, population concentration and dispersements,
transportation patterns, health services, law enforcement and control of
criminal activity-to cite a few examples in a practically limitless field.
This technological revolution cannot be ignored. But has it any
limits? If it does, or if it should, then we must commit ourselves to
begin to define the nature of these limits, and to inquire to what extent
the limits can be accommodated or harmonized with the expanding
technology.
In analyzing privacy, it is most meaningful to see it in its broadest
aspect: namely, to determine what role it plays in the society. In order
to see that role, in our democratic society, it may be helpful by way of
contrast to describe the antithetical posture it maintains in a totalitarian
regime.
The modern totalitarian state relies, in varying degrees, on secrecy
for the regime and full surveillance for all other groups. Both Fascist
and Communist literature are replete with attacks on the idea of
privacy as "immoral," "antisocial," and part of "the cult of individualism." In the consolidation phase, totalitarianism commands that traditional confidential relationships be destroyed, surveillance systems and
3 The Design of a Federal Statistical Data Center, National Bureau of Standards as
reported in the Hearings of Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 294 (1969).
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informers installed, thorough dossiers compiled on its citizens, and
privacy denied. Affirmative and unwavering loyalty is exacted, which
tends to isolate the citizen; he, in turn, seeks refuge in the state and
identifies with its programs. Although a certain degree of privacy is
permitted following consolidation of power, the primary surveillance
systems of paid and voluntary spies, eavesdropping and watching devices, and strict records control, are retained to keep the regime on its
guard.

4

Professor Westin has said: "Just as a social balance favoring disclosure-surveillance to the exclusion of privacy considerations is a functional necessity for totalitarian systems, so a balance that insures strong
citadels of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure
and surveillance is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies. The
democratic society relies on publicity as a control of government and
privacy as a shield for group and individual life."
A democratic system encourages personal retreat for the individual,
to secure perspective and critical judgment. A strong commitment to
the family as a basic, autonomous unit responsible for important educational, religious and moral roles is recognized. Consequently, claims to
physical and legal privacy against society and the state help to preserve
the family relationship intact. Religious diversity and ideas of toleration
guarantee that religious choice is a matter of private concern. The
citizenry is afforded a wide freedom to join associations and participate
in group affairs; to this end, privacy of membership and intra-group
action is protected. Maximum freedom for political choice is assured
by providing a secret ballot and by forbidding governmental inquiries
into a citizen's past voting record. Through a constellation of political,
legal and constitutional restraints, democratic societies safeguard the
individual's person and personality from improper police conduct such
as physical brutality, compulsory self-incrimination, and unreasonable
searches and seizures. As said by Professor Westin, a balance is set between "government's organizational needs for preparatory and institutional privacy and the need of the press, interest groups, and other
governmental agencies for the knowledge required to keep government
conduct responsible."
When we begin thinking of privacy in this larger institutional
framework, we are called upon to scan the entire spectrum of surveillance technology. The pervasiveness and impact of this surveillance
4 The ideas contained in the next few paragraphs were derived from a reading of
Westin, Science, Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, Part 1, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1003 (1966).
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cannot be narrowed or isolated into one of its components, that is, data
processing. Surveillance has to be considered in its totality-whether it
be physical through listening or watching devices, psychologicalthrough
the use of mental testing, drugs, or other emotion measuring devices,
or data secured via the collection, storage, exchange and collation of
comprehensive information through computers and other electronic
processing systems..
We cannot overemphasize the impact of an all-embracing surveillance system on the actions of any individual or group of individuals.
How would we behave in a conference room, for example, if we knew
that persons were observing our every movement by some televising
device? Would our freedom of speech be circumscribed if every time
we made a phone call we knew some third party was listening? How
would our thoughts be channeled if we knew that every fact in our lives
was coded and stored in one central location, instantaneously accessible
to certain persons? The potential for inhibiting our conduct, our actions and our thoughts is very real.
If we exclude the wide range of surveillance forms from our consideration, and treat the privacy issue only in relation to data processing,
our efforts at resolution of the problems will be quite insufficient.
Unless the issue of privacy is considered in this broader context and,
as Westin states, is in the forefront of the planning and administration
of future computer systems, "the possibilities of data surveillance over
the individual in 1984 could be chilling." 5
LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRIVACY CONCEPT

From the legal vantage point, the concept of privacy has several
facets.
One notion of privacy, evolved by the courts, is derived from a
traditional common law base involving doctrines of tort, contract and
property law. 6 Other courts have found a right of privacy in their respective state constitutions. 7 There also has been a judicial recognition
of the right of privacy as inherent in the rights of the individual, despite
the fact that it does not fit within traditional common law precepts.,
Most significantly, recent cases decided by the United States Supreme
5 Id.

at 1013.

6 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
7 See for example Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
8 Pavesich -v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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Court have indicated that our Federal Constitution may embody a
guaranty of a right to privacy.9
There is also a fundamental sense of the right which permeates
the mind of society at large, and will naturally be reflected in a court's
treatment of a privacy situation.
That the concept of privacy is not so clearly definable as the right
of free speech, or freedom of religion, is evident from a study of case
law and treatises. There is no clearly articulated formulation of what
privacy is in fact, and we have acquired an amalgam of definitions.
Privacy has been variously defined as "the right to be let alone"'10 and
"... an interest in not having his affairs known to others ... "I'
Article 17 of the United Nations' Draft Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights incorporated the concept of privacy thus:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.' 2
Thus, the rubric "right of privacy" has been used in various ways
to mean many things, both in law and common parlance.
The law has developed along certain lines in the privacy area, in
a manner at once classical and innovative. It is classical in the sense
that new ideas are superimposed upon a presently existing legal structure; for example, privacy considered as a contract right or a property
right. 3 It is innovative in that, daily, the privacy concept is creatively
and imaginatively dealt with by the judiciary and characterized in
unique terms not describable within the ambit of well established legal
jargon.
Early Cases
The judicial history of privacy began with the 1849 case of Prince
Albert v. Strange.1 4 In this case an art dealer, without authorization,
9 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); accord, Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967). However, Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1968) indicates that the court may have some reservations about Griswold's holding. He implies that the States are the proper guardians of individual privacy. Id. at 350,
n.4.
10 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (Ct. App. 1902).
11 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
12 Art. 17, Draft Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly of the
United Nations, 1960.
13 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6.
14 18 L. J. Ch. 120 (Mac. & G. 25 (1849)).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1: 7

published for sale etchings conceived and executed by the Prince Consort. The court declared here, for the first time, that some kind of a
right of privacy exists, and that it is of no consequence that such a right
was not judicially recognized by the common law. The case turned not
on Albert's property right in the etchings, but on the privacy accorded
a Prince.
A second significant decision was the American case of Manola v.
Stevens (unreported), involving the unauthorized photographing of an
actress during her performance while scantily clad. The court here
issued an injunction against publishing such photos on the ground that
it was a denial of the actress' privacy and as such, denial of a property
right. This case marked the derivative application of the tort-property
concept of privacy: that is, the protection of the individual against the
unauthorized use of some aspect of his person or some extension of his
personality.
It is important to note, however, the reasoning by which the courts
used to reach their end in such cases as this. They did not say, "This
individual's right of privacy has been invaded and so we must stop the
advertiser." Rather, they said, "The advertiser is making a profit from
the use of another's name or likeness, and thus he is taking property
away from one to whom it rightfully belongs." This is a far cry from
affirming the existence of a right of privacy per se; it is an example of
the classical method of categorizing a heretofore nonextant right into a
preexisting legal doctrine.
Another important judicial analysis in this area is found in the
1905 case of Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company.15 This

case related to the unauthorized use of the plaintiff's picture for advertising purposes. Here the court openly recognized privacy as a
natural right of the individual, and rejected the notion that such a right
has to be superimposed on a previously existing framework such as a
tort or contract. The court said:
When the law guaranties to one the right to the enjoyment of
his life, it gives him something more than the mere right to breathe
and exist. While, of course, the most flagrant violation of this right
would be deprivation of life, yet life itself may be spared, and the
enjoyment of life entirely destroyed. An individual has a right to
enjoy life in any way that may be most agreeable and pleasant to
him, according to his temperament and nature, provided that in
such enjoyment he does not invade the rights of his neighbor, or
violate public law or policy.... The liberty which he derives from

natural law, and which is recognized by municipal law, embraces
far more than freedom from physical restraint.
15 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
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A new foundation emerged when a California. state court, in Melvin v. Reid in 1931,16 recognized the right on a state constitutional base.
This case involved a motion picture based on plaintiff's past life as a
prostitute, after she had been reformed. The court held that the state
constitution, which guaranteed the individual the right to pursue happiness, was violated by this invasion into plaintiff's privacy.
Oddly enough, some of the celebrated cases in which the courts
recognized a right to privacy grew out of factual situations where the
court may very well have been more interested in suppressing the
exhibit disclosed-e.g., photo of a scantily clad woman, a motion picture about a prostitute-than they were in safeguarding the individual's
privacy. Thus a strain of puritanism in American life might, unwittingly, have had more to do with the courts' treatment of the privacy
issue than the purposes which have been ascribed to it.
These cases based on the common law were not suited to deal
with the technological advances of the twentieth century. While the
courts were willing and able to suppress information when the person
whose right was invaded was subject to loss of profits or property, they
were unable to deal effectively on these terms with wiretapping, modern
photography and other modern methods of surveillance which constituted a more subtle invasion of personal life.
Recent Developments
Starting in the 1950's, however, the United States Supreme Court
began to find in the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments certain aspects
of what may be called a right inhering in the citizen to prevent certain
governmental intrusions. Our Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that evidence seized in contravention of the security of the individual or his home is inadmissible
at trial. Weeks v. United States,1 7 Mapp v. Ohio.s
The Supreme-Court in Watkins v. United States, 19 recognized the
individual's right to privacy by preventing a Congressional investigating committee from exposing a person's background for exposure's sake
alone. While the Court recognized the right of privacy inherent in the
individual, that case primarily dealt with the witness' claiming of his
privilege against self-incrimination.
In NAACP v. Alabama,20 the Court upheld privacy of association
by refusing to order the NAACP to reveal the names of its members
16 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
1T 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
20

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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to the state government which ostensibly required such a list in order
to admit the NAACP as an out-of-state corporation. The Court unanimously declared that privacy of association is inextricably bound up
with the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
In Shelton v. Tucker,2 ' teachers of Arkansas were required by
the State to list every organization to which they had belonged for five
years prior to their appointment. Although the Court struck down
this statute as too broad in scope, it was protecting the same First
Amendment right of freedom of association that it upheld in NAACP

v. Alabama.
Commentators on cases such as Silverman v. United States, 22 and
Lopez v. United States,23 which involve electronic eavesdropping devices, indicate that the stress is on the protection of interest in privacy
rather than the manner in which the interest is affected. Previously, in
1928, in Olmstead v. United States, 24 the Supreme Court had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not preclude wiretapping
where there was no physical invasion of the property in question.
One of the most important recent cases is Griswold v. Connecticut,25 in which the majority of the Court agreed that the Connecticut contraceptive law violated the right to privacy of married
persons. The Court said:
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The
Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people."
The more recent case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,26 sharply raised the issue
of privacy in relation to news publications. Life Magazine had reported
on a play which depicted the ordeal of the Hill family, which had
21
22
23
24
25
26

364 U.S. 479 (1960).
365 U.S. 505 (1961).
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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been held hostage by a group of escaped convicts. James Hill sued
Life on the basis of the New York Civil Rights statute which provides
that:
A person, firm, or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for the purpose of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any
living person without having first obtained the written consent of
such person, or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty
of a misdemeanor.
James Hill asked for damages on the ground that Life intended
to present an untrue picture in that the play represented the actual
Hill family. A New York jury awarded the plaintiff a $50,000 verdict,
and the defendant appealed on the ground that its right of free speech
and press had been violated.
The interpretation by the New York courts of their civil rights
statute was such that if the news article was true and concerned a newsworthy individual, then no action would lie. However, if the publisher
should fictionalize any portion of the facts, the individual would have
a cause of action against the publication. The Life article depicted
scenes from the play which were a fictionalization of the events which
actually transpired.
This case raised the issue of a clash between freedom of the press
under the United States Constitution and an individual's right to
privacy under a state statute. The importance of freedom of the press
was emphasized in the majority opinion when Mr. Justice Brennan
said, "A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance
of our political system and an open society." The majority balanced
this right against the individual's right to privacy and found that whenever a person becomes newsworthy or a public figure, his right to
privacy must give way to the freedom of the press which protects the
public's right to know. The verdict below was reversed on the narrow
ground that the instructions to the jury were incorrect. The action
reflected the disagreement in the Court.
Three Justices-Black, Douglas and Harlan-felt this was not a
case which involved the individual's right of privacy but should be
viewed strictly as a case of freedom of the press. However, it is clear
from a reading of their opinions that they were concerned with the
individual's right to be protected from unwarranted interference by
newspapers.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Fortas, in which he was joined by Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Clark, is a forthright declaration of
the constitution, l .a§s Qf the right of privacy. In defining this right,
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Justice Fortas said: "It is, simply stated, the right to be let alone; to
live one's life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion
except as they can be justified by the clear needs of community living
under a government of law." His reading of Griswold v. Connecticut,
was that it was "squarely based upon the right of privacy which the
Court derived by implication from the specific guarantees of the Bill
of Rights."
A ConstitutionalStatus
Thus it is evident that some constitutional notion of a right to
privacy has evolved over the years. There is a school of thought, of
which Mr. Justice Black is notably one, which reads the Constitution
literally and finds no basis for a right to privacy contained in it.
But Professor Beaney has noted that "it is hard to see how several
of the specific rights [in the Constitution] can be given meaningful
scope without necessarily safeguarding a right to privacy. It would be
indeed ironic if this were not so in a constitutional system designed to
protect the integrity of the individual in an age that laid stress on the
necessity of recognizing both the rational and irrational elements in
man but which, above all, wanted to protect his dignity and status as
27
an individual."
Parenthetically, it may be appropriate to note that in addition to
the legal concept of privacy which has evolved over the years, there
exists a sociological concept: that is, the things that a man thinks are
nobody's business but his own. These things vary from era to era and
from individual to individual and so are not suitable to listing. As
Frank Thayer has noted:
The right of privacy though not regularly recognized as such,
has been tacitly enforced by the mores of certain peoples, good
28
taste, and immemorial custom.
Obviously, the community feeling should be part of our awareness
in any discussion of the right of privacy, since in a democratic society
what the public thinks its rights are is what they often become. In
Professor Beaney's words: "For, at heart, the values that find expression
in legal decisions, statutes, or administrative rules and orders must
reflect the consensus of the leaders of opinion and action in the wider
29
society.
27

Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31

LAW AND
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253, 260 (1966).
28 THAYER, LEGAL CONTROLS OF THE
29

Beaney, supra nofr 27 at 271.

PREss 434 (Foundation Press 1956).
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Thus, the arrows are all aimed at the same target: that is, the point
at which the Supreme Court reflects the mores of the citizens when it
signals constitutional recognition of an individual's right to privacy,
the right to be constitutionally free from intrusion, be it an innocuous
survey or an elaborate personnel questionnaire. The judicial concern
for the liberties of the individual makes it plainly visible, and it will
have an immediate and dramatic effect on the future of data processing
and automation in government, raising the privacy-surveillance dichotomy to a constitutional dimension.
THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS

Although a certain sanctity may protect the individual's right of
privacy, that right, like so many others, is relative, even if it is to be
accorded full constitutional recognition by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The yardstick may well be the question: Is the information sought
reasonably related to advancing the general health, welfare, or safety
of the community? This is the perennial problem of balancing the
citizens' interest in being left alone with society's need.
The developments of science in the last few decades would appear
to have outstripped decisional law reflecting the problems and technology of the era. Today, conversations can be overheard blocks away
without the persons involved ever knowing it. The computer and
automated data processing equipment give the government an opportunity to process such a volume of data at such high speed that the
lag between an administrative or policy decision and its effect on the

citizen is tremendously reduced.
Raw data on each citizen, when placed in a computer, can be of
great utility to the government. If the existence of such computerized
data, however, offends the community sense of the right to privacy, and
if the courts are unable to balance the competing interests to the satisfaction of the community, the reaction may be in the form of legislation
not necessarily best suited to the delicate balancing required.
When we speak of the individual's right of privacy, we are essen-

tially recognizing his right, also, to withhold certain information about
himself which he may not wish to disclose. His right to withhold, however, may not be justified under all circumstances, just as the inquirer's
right to know may be unwarranted in any number of situations. It is
necessary to identify the competing interests in order to weigh the
relative factors favoring disclosure when we focus on the data gathering stage. Here the individual's right to withhold information of a
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rather impersonal, statistical nature is juxtaposed to the government's
"need to know" certain information. What happens, however, when
we decide to gather information of a more personal nature-on personal habits and attitudes, for example? Is not the burden on the government to justify the present need for such data?
Of course, government can resort to the answer that it is economically advantageous to collect the information now and that at some
future time the information will be available for computer application
when required to serve some legitimate social purpose. This approach
evades the issue and generates additional problems, one of which is the
potential risk of disclosure of the collected but unused information.
The situation posed is very real, and information will beget information. Furthermore, there is the rationale that this is in keeping
with the continuing interest of government to know, to predict and to
regulate in order to shoulder the responsibility for the well-being and
affluence of its citizens. As inquiry broadens and becomes more personal, however, the question arises whether government should not be
obliged to demonstrate clearly the present need for such information.
Once information is disclosed by the individual, access to it requires identification of a whole new set of competing interests. For
example, should the individual himself be entitled to complete and
uninhibited access to all the information the government possesses on
him? Under certain circumstances, where the information, if released,
might be misunderstood or harmful to the individual, access to the information may very well be denied.
Should there be free access to information on individuals as between governmental agencies on the same level, and as between federal,
state and local governments? Should non-governmental inquirersprospective employers, credit agencies, relatives, members of the press,
to mention a few-have access to information on an individual?
In view of the complexities and variances involved, probably no
iron-clad rule can be formulated to apply across the board to the situation in which one individual has disclosed information and he or
others may seek access to it. Again, we have to resort to a balancing of
competing interests. Identifying the particular interests involved,
coupled with the nature of the information desired, may be crucial for
the decision.
Generally, the so-called "right to know" situation arises in a context in which a third person seeks information about an individual or,
perhaps, a number of individuals. This third person may be a taxpayer,
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who insists on seeing the tax rolfs in a community so that he can find
whether the assessed valuation on his property is in line with valuations
on similarly-situated properties. A newspaper reporter may want information to provide background for a story. A prospective employer
has an interest in seeking to trace the work history of a job applicant. A
parent may wish to be apprised of a teacher's comments on the potentialities of his child. Thus, clearly, there are legitimate areas of inquiry
on the part of third persons for accessibility to information on individuals.
Oftentimes, various levels of government wish to exchange information on individuals. There may very well be wholesome reasons
for such cooperative exchanges, particularly in the area of law enforcement information.
This entire matter of release of information, after an individual
has made a disclosure to a governmental agency, is further complicated
by the notion of consent. Does the fact that the individual has disclosed
information to a specific agency for a definite purpose grant that agency
carte blanche to revealing such information? Does not the individual
reasonably anticipate that the disclosure will be kept confidential?
Moreover, the legal efficacy of consent loses a good deal of its force if
the individual divulged the information to secure a benefit to which
he may have been entitled to under law. The contention that there
has been a "consent" in this context may appear to be unrealistic. And
the problem of securing an individual's consent every time the release
of information is requested is a different one with which we shall have
to deal.
Existing controls over the release of information secured from individuals are dealt with by legislative, judicial and executive measures.
These measures vary in their import. Some demand disclosure, others
prohibit it. No uniform approach is readily discernible. Consequently,
the possibility of incongruous results is omnipresent. A lot of hard
thinking is going to have to be exerted to devise criteria by which to
measure whether disclosure is proper in a given situation.
ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFEGUARDS

Normally, when we think of safeguards, we think in terms of those
the law may provide. In the law it is an axiom that for every right infringed there exists a remedy. But invasion of one's privacy does not
lend itself to a simple solution like payment of damages in a negligence
case. One authority put it as follows:
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Restitution in any literal sense is simply impossible in the context
of disclosures of sensitive data; once made, a disclosure cannot be
erased. 30
As such, the traditional tort money-damages approach appears ineffective in the area of privacy.
Another traditional remedy is that of injunctive relief. Again, it
would appear to be of little utility in protecting an individual's right
of privacy, once unauthorized access has taken place.
A deterrent to disclosure might be criminal penalties. For example, it is a crime for employees of the Internal Revenue Service to
divulge information from federal income tax returns unless authorized
by law. Penalties are provided for such disclosure. The Civil Rights
Act also calls for criminal penalties if a community service officer discloses data learned in a conciliation conference.
Submerging all the traditional issues, however, is the threshold
difficulty of discovering that an unauthorized disclosure has been made.
If information was revealed, it may not be known what information
was revealed, to whom it was revealed, and the extent, if any, of the
harm.
Preventative Approach
Thus, a lack of weapons in the legal arsenal may very well leave
those who have been wronged without a remedy in law. If this be the
case, and there are strong indications that it would be, then controls of
a preventative nature appear the way to seek to protect the right. Such
an approach would at least represent a minimal effort in the right direction. In other words greater emphasis must be placed on preventing
unauthorized and unwarranted access or disclosure.
It appears that this may have to be approached from two sides.
On the one hand, policy-makers must determine what kind of information should be disclosed, to whom, and for what reasons. On the other
hand, they must also establish controls over those in a position to make
disclosures.
Data to be Disclosed
There is one broad category of data which poses no difficultygeneral statistics as opposed to data on individuals. Data of this variety
are, by their very nature, dehumanized and, thus, have little or no
bearing on the privacy issue.
30 Karst, The Files: Legal Controls over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored
Personal Data, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 342, 351 (1966).
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It is information on individuals which may require a predetermined disclosure policy. It may be established by statute that personal
information gathered by a data bank may be disseminated only to governmental agencies requesting it. Furthermore, the type of data supplied to any agency might be restricted solely to that which is necessary
for the function the agency is required to perform. Finally, the data
might not be provided unless the agency demonstrates the need.
This selective approach is, of course, premised on the capacity of
computer "hardware" to provide specific information for a specific
purpose. I assume there would be no technical difficulties in this regard.
How might this work? Let us assume an individual's file is categorized to include, among other things, a criminal background. This
information would be akin to what is now gathered by the F.B.I. If the
F.B.I. participated in a data bank, only that information would be
provided, on the basis of need, to a law enforcement agency requesting
same for investigative or prosecutorial purposes.
A similar selective process might apply, for example, if a State
Motor Vehicle agency wanted to determine the motor vehicle record
of someone who recently moved into that state and applied for a driver's
license. If all states provided such data to a central bank, the specific
information sought on the individual could be rapidly ascertained.
These hypotheticals, of course, are of the simple variety. Many
governmental agencies perform functions which require more personal
and comprehensive information about an individual, for example, for
employment purposes. Here again, an effort should be made to determine the type of information needed for a limited purpose and provided
only on the basis of need. It might be necessary to require any agency
wishing to participate in a data bank to determine, as a prerequisite,
the kind of data it intends to retrieve. Once that determination is made
and approved by a policy-making body, it would have to be adhered to
stringently.
CONTROL OF DATA CUSTODIAN

The second feature of the preventative approach would involve
establishing controls over the person in a position to disclose data.
Assuming a predetermined policy of what, when, to whom, and for
what needs information should be disclosed, the indiscretions of a data
custodian may not be so difficult to minimize. But this cannot be left
to the mere guidance of law itself.
Someone should be empowered to oversee the disclosure of data
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in a manner consistent with legislative policy. In addition to setting
forth disclosure policy, enabling legislation might set the framework
of a data bank agency and provide for administrative policing of its
activities.
This might take the form of a corps of custodians, certified by the
State, not unlike other persons in positions of public trust who are
subject to State regulation. Special training programs might be established as a prerequisite for these positions. 31 They might be private or
public custodians, but, in any event, they would be divorced from the
technical aspects of data systems and would be charged only with
managing and controlling the flow of information to authorized recipients. Furthermore, an auditing system should be established in
order that a different agency or group of individuals might, from time
to time, verify the validity and handling of inquiries. In addition to
auditing, this group could monitor the computer programs to insure
that there are no unauthorized modes of access. Occasional attempts
might be made to penetrate the system as a running check on its
32
security.
In any event, provision should be made for administrative discipline of custodians and those whom they manage. The minimum
penalty for wrongful disclosure might be dismissal. It may also be
appropriate to fix a statutory penalty for which the victim could sue,
in addition to any actual damages which may be recoverable in a
civil action 3
Drafting of legislation in this field is, by no means, an easy task.
The office of Statistical Standards of the Budget Bureau began two
years ago to draft a measure to provide specific privacy safeguards in a
centralized computer system. While they agreed it should be done, it
was reported that Director Raymond T. Bowman and his staff were
34
"baffled" by the assignment.
Regardless of the ultimate design of this effort, responsible State
administrators and legislators cannot be any the less vigilant themselves. Anything less than a constant awareness of the potential for
invasion of the citizen's privacy will be a partial abdication of our responsibility. In meeting this responsibility, it will be incumbent on us,
along with others, to formulate policy as to what information should
Id. at 363.
32 The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
Task Force on Science and Technology, 75, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington (1967).
33 Karst, supra note 30, at 366.
34 N.Y. Times, supra note I at 52, col. 1.
31
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or should not be made available under a multitude of circumstances.
We, and not the custodians of the information, should determine how
and under what circumstances it will be made available.
The safeguards discussed herein are designed to insure that only
those with a legitimate need to sensitive information may have access
to it. To an extent, this is a mechanical problem, in that we must be
sure that information is not inadvertently made public because a
gadget went awry. Here we shall have to rely heavily on the expertise
of persons qualified to gauge the risk of error and to evaluate the
mechanical effectiveness of security devices. In the ultimate, however,
as Professor Reich of Yale warns,
The real protection in this area comes not from peoples' good
35
intentions but from laws.
A discussion of safeguards naturally progresses to the point where
consideration of the advisability of centralizing a data system must be
faced. Safeguards that may be sufficient where data are not available
through a linked network of systems, or stored in a central bank, may
be insufficient when centralization is the case. If we recognize the function that privacy is to fulfill in a democratic society, it may be necessary
for us to insist upon the proliferation of information sources rather
than run the risk of an overpowering surveillance inherent in centralization.
Vance Packard points to four major dangers of centralization: (1)
computers are ill-equipped to correct errors, or allow for extenuating
circumstances, for redemption is likely to be incomprehensible to a
computer; (2) gTeat power would be placed in the hands of people who
would use the system; (3) public distrust of "big brother," if increased,
might lead to wholesale falsification or evasion on forms; and (4)
"Americans, increasingly and rightly, resent their being numbers, controlled by a computer," and they resent the accelerating depersonaiization of individuals.36
The relationship between privacy and ADP has received some attention in prominent intergovernmental circles. In early 1968, the
Committee on Information Systems of the Council of State Governments prepared a policy statement in which it was recommended that
the States exercise leadership in the coordination of information
systems in full consultation with local governments, and in cooperation
with each other and the federal government, to achieve compatibility
among the various systems. It further warned that information systems
35 Id.
36
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should be so designed as to assure that "the privacy of individuals may
not be invaded nor the confidentiality of information pertaining to
37
persons be breached."
In August of 1967, the National Association of Attorneys General
also adopted a resolution pointing to the "broad legal, ethical and
political ramifications" of the ADP revolution. It further urged that
"the fundamental, humanistic questions, notably the issue of privacy,
generated by this information be fully explored and studied" by the
Committee on Information Systems of the Council of State Governments on which the National Association of Attorneys General is
represented.
To be sure, a unified information system has definite economic,
efficiency and spatial advantages. Sharing of facilities and time will no
doubt cut operational cost. Instantaneous accessibility to a total information system will aid those who use new and unique applications
to advance social objectives. These plusses cannot be discounted.
Nevertheless, we are talking about a right that is precious to our
political system. To the extent that we infringe upon the exercise of
that right, we undermine our free society. It is, therefore, incumbent
on all who are in a position to influence and initiate policy in this
sphere to examine the fundamental humanistic questions occasioned
by the information explosion-before these questions are completely
obscured by the intricacies of the technology itself.
37 State Information Systems Policy Statement, Recommended by Committee on
Information Systems of the Council of State Governments, January 3, 1968.

